process depend on such details.17 In Gray v. Atkins,'8 the first round of the historic legal battle in Local 88 of the Master Mates & Pilots, members of the election committee sought to enjoin the local officers from encroaching on their authority to conduct the election. President Atkins, a candidate for reelection, had decided the format of the ballots, ordered them printed, and mailed them out. They were not consecutively numbered, and only Atkins knew how many were printed. In addition, the return address on the ballots mailed was the union office so that undeliverable ballots came into the incumbents' hands. The election committee was denied access to a membership list showing each member's financial standing, and to membership signature cards to check against returned ballots. In bringing the suit, the election committee was less concerned with asserting its authority than insisting on detailed safeguards to insure an honest election.
Basic rights in the nominating process often depend upon isolated and seemingly remote details. Rejecting a nomination for lack of a second, after hasty closing of the nominations, may be but an excuse to eliminate unwanted opposition's Rival candidates may be declared disqualified for delinquency in dues even though their dues book shows them fully paid up,20 or employers may be induced to manipulate check-offs so as to disqualify potential opponents to the administration. The impact of detailed rules -may be even more subtle. Requiring candidates to declare their candidacy four months prior to the nomination meeting may deter opposition where the union holds effective control over job opportunities, for it compels potential insurgents to expose themselves to the hazards of punitive action. Requiring candidates for top office to have served previously on the executive board seriously handicaps an opposition group in replacing the incumbents unless it can inspire a "'palace revolt."22 These disputes do not concern mere technicalities but involve the right of the individual to run for office and, more importantly, the right of members to select leaders of their own choosing. Restaurant Employees petitioned the court to appoint an administrator to conduct the election. They claimed that the election committee had not been elected but appointed by the trustee; that two leaders on the opposition slate had been wrongfully disqualified for suing the union; and that the election committee undermined a third candidate, by declaring that putting him on the ballot did not determine his ability to hold office, as he might be disqualified under the provision which barred members of subversive groups. They further claimed that the election committee delayed passing on the qualifications of opposition candidates and announcing the row on the ballot assigned to the opposition group, thereby giving the administration, whose candidates and place on the ballot were predetermined, extra time to campaign "Vote Row A." When the ballots were printed, an opposition candidate for vice- This content downloaded on Thu, 14 Mar 2013 08:54:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions president who had a large following was not listed with the opposition slate but in a separate row as an independent. Throughout the campaign, the Local's paper supported the administration and bitterly attacked the opposing candidate. The core of the complaint was that the administration group, by controlling the election committee and the union newspaper, had gained an unfair advantage over the opposition group. Competitive advantage can be achieved by manipulating detailed elements of the election process. Stewards can be elected at large rather than by districts,29 or certain local unions may be consolidated to engulf pockets of opposition. Officers seeking reelection may use the union letterhead for campaign mailings, gaining not only a financial but psychological advantage because of the official appearance of their statements.30 The ballot may be arranged to favor one slate; the election may be adjourned to frustrate a large opposition turnout ;3 or the polling places may be more convenient for one faction than another. Even variations between the sample ballot and the actual ballot may produce charges of unfairness where one group's leaflets have heavily emphasized their ballot position, particularly among non-English speaking members. 32 The most important aspect of maintaining equality between the competing groups is providing equal access to the membership during the election campaign. The two critical instruments for access are the union newspaper and the union membership list. In Ford v. Curran 33 a defeated candidate in the National Maritime Union asked the court to set aside the election because President Curran had used his column in the union newspaper to recommend the administration slate and castigate the opposition. In other cases opposition groups have sought to neutralize the newspaper either by enjoining it from printing matter favorable or unfavorable to any candidate34 or by compelling it to give equal space to all candidates.35 Even this, however, cannot fully counterbalance the printing of news stories that may indirectly aid one side or the other. 36. In the later election in Local 88 of the Master Mates & Pilots the trustee of the local, who was also a candidate, had printed in the union newspaper a copy of the trusteeship report required to be filed under the Labor Reform Act. This report inevitably justified the trusteeship and criticized the insurgents for their conduct which brought about trusteeship. It also placed the best light on the trustee's own administration. The opposition complained that this violated the stipulation that the newspaper was to remain neutral, but the court appointed administrator took no action other than to admonish that the newspaper should contain only factual reporting and no editorializing.
Access to the membership list is even more critical, especially when the members are widely scattered. A Bartenders local may cover several counties,37 an Operating Engineers local may contain 4,000 members working in small groups throughout the New York City area,38 and members of a maritime union may be scattered to the four winds.39 Without a membership list, candidates cannot know who are members or where to contact them. This inevitably works in favor of the incumbents, for in administering the union they can establish contact, make themselves and their views known, and hold a virtual monopoly over the channels of communication.40 The opposition requires access to the union newspaper and membership lists to help offset the inherent advantages of the administration.
C. Political Control of The Election Process
The problem of maintaining equality in a contested election is aggravated by the fact that control of the process is commonly in the hands of one of the competing factions. The lack of any established two-party system in most unions hinders the development of devices for sharing of control between the opposing groups. The court may even be asked to confirm control in one of the competing groups. Thus in Gray v. Atkins,41 the center of the legal battle was whether the election committee or the incumbent officers should print and control the handling of the ballots and make rules governing access to the union newspaper and membership lists.
Normally union officers control the election process. They call and preside at the nomination meeting, rule on the qualifications of candidates, design the ballot, fix the time and place of the election, and rule on the qualifications of voters. Many of these functions may be vested in an election committee, but, as Contes v. Ross illustrates, the administration group often dominates this committee.42 Although those in control are governed by the union constitution, 42. Although the original decision or the decision on appeal concerning a dispute in a local union election is made by the international officers, political considerations may control. In releasing a local union from trusteeship, the international officers commonly seek to install local officers who are sympathetic. In other cases, international officers may have political alliances with the local administration or see the opposition group in the local as a present or potential opposition group at the international level. In general, most international officers do not look with favor upon "factional" (that is, opposition) groups within the local unions, and this strengthens their self-restraint in not interfering with local autonomy. its sketchy provisions leave substantial room to maneuver for critical advantages.
The use of outside agencies such as the Honest Ballot Association or the Election Institute to conduct union elections may reduce but will seldom solve the problem of political control. If they do no more than collect the ballots and count them, the most important parts of the election process are left in the hands of the incumbent officers. Seldom are such agencies given sufficient authority and responsibility over the entire process to prevent political manipulation of critical details. They put their imprint of integrity on an election whose integrity they cannot warrant and thereby lull the courts into the pleasant illusion that intervention is unnecessary.
Protecting the election process, therefore, makes exacting demands on the courts. To determine the importance of any claimed defect, the court must be sensitive to the potential importance of details, examine closely the entire factual context of the dispute, and weigh the subtle impact the defect may have on the process. The task is made even more difficult by the need to define fair competition in such a way as to provide practical equality between the contending factions when the group in power not only enjoys inherent advantages but controls the election process.
The foregoing discussion has focused mainly on local union elections, for these produce the great bulk of litigation. Disputes in national elections seldom come before the courts,43 in large part because the great majority of those elections are uncontested and therefore generate no disputes." When contested, national elections pose many of the same problems as local elections, but in greater magnitude. The very size and structure of the union, along with wide dispersal of its members, increases the complexity of the process and gives the incumbents a greater advantage. National elections, however, pose additional problems. Whether election is by referendum or through delegates to the convention, balloting must be done through the local unions.45 Defects in the procedures at this level may disenfranchise the whole local or cast a cloud on the whole election.46 The court's problem of supervising or reviewing a national election is further complicated by the difficulty of obtaining Traditional doctrine declares that courts will not intervene in the internal affairs of voluntary associations except to protect property rights. This doctrine, however, has not hindered the New York courts from intervening in union elections. The accordion term "property" has proven sufficiently expansive to include both the interest of the candidate in holding the office,48 and the interest of the members that the elected officers serve their terms. To the argument that union members had no property right in the election of officers, the court in Dusing v. Nuzzo 49 responded:
The right to membership in a union is empty if the corresponding right to an election guaranteed with equal solemnity in the fundamental law of the union is denied. If a member has a "'property right" in his position on the roster, I think he has an equally enforcible right in the election of men who will represent him in dealing with his economic security and collective bargaining where that right exists by virtue of express contract in the language of a union constitution. Where an election is required by the law of a union, the member denied the right to participate is denied a substantial right which is neither nebulous nor ephemeral.
The court then issued a detailed order compelling the union to hold a long overdue election.
The New York courts have manifested a willingness not only to require an election to be held,50 but have at various times intervened at every stage in the election process. Thus, the courts have enjoined the holding of an election because the election district was improperly drawn,5' there was not adequate notice of the nomination meeting, and members were intimidated from making nominations.52 The names of candidates improperly stricken from the ballot have been ordered restored,53 equal access to the union newspaper 59 In these cases, the courts affirmatively intervened to regulate the election process, but even when relief has been denied it has not been for lack of a justicable interest, but because the court found that the plaintiff's case lacked merit 60 or that he had failed to exhaust his internal remedies.6'
The demonstrated willingness of the New York courts to intervene in union election disputes only opens the door to the difficult question-What standards do the courts apply in determining the merits of the particular case? This requires looking beyond the theories articulated by the courts to attempt to discern the inarticulate standards in fact applied.
A. The Union Constitution As A Standard
In union elections, as in other internal union cases, the articulated judicial theory is that the union constitution and by-laws comprise a contract between the union and its members.62 Each member, whether a candidate [Vol.70:1221 or a potential voter, has a legally enforcible right that elections be conducted in compliance with the constitution and by-laws.63 The practical significance of the contract theory is that it establishes the union's own constitution as the ostensible standard for judicial settlement of internal union disputes.
This standard has proven neither so precise nor so complete as the language in the cases pretend, but it does provide the initial guide-line for the courts. Where constitutional provisions are explicit, the courts require strict compliance. Thus, courts have refused to recognize custom or past practice as justifying any deviation from the prescribed procedures," even though these were followed in good faith and provided greater opportunity for the members to participate. Although the courts sometimes say that only "substantial compliance" is required,66 the cases indicate that they actually enforce the constitutional provisions with single-minded rigidity.
Some looseness and flexibility in this standard is inevitable, for even explicit provisions often prove unclear in concrete cases. The words of the constitution must be interpreted, and this is for the courts. pretation,"89 in rejecting the Board's interpretation it was in effect substituting one of its own. Some opinions declare that the courts will follow the interpretations of the union election committee or other appropriate officers.Y Close study of the cases, however, suggests that the courts in fact make an independent determination, and if this coincides with the union's decision, they then use the language of deference to reinforce their conclusion. Interpretation is not always a colorless process, but may provide the court an opportunity to shade meaning with judicially conceived values. The election cases do not bear such clear marks of this as the discipline cases, but traces are not lacking. In Fisher v. Kempter,7 for example, suit was brought to enjoin the installation of officers accused and later found guilty of misappropriating union funds. The court voided the election on the ground that the notice provision of the international constitution had not been followed. The local constitution contained no such provision, but the court held that the international constitution governed. In Wilkens v. Sofield,12 suit was brought to enjoin giving effect to a referendum on by-laws which would have vested dictatorial powers in the local president. The international constitution provided that local by-laws could be amended by vote at a meeting or by a referendum, but the local constitution contained no provision for referendum. The court held that the local constitution controlled and granted the injunction. Although the two cases are not logically irreconcilable, the records in the cases suggest that the decisions were influenced by other than neutral principles of interpretation.
In addition the courts have reshaped the constitution as a standard by finding that particular provisions were contrary to public policy and void.73 This power has not been used in election cases, primarily because election provisions on their face affirm rather than deny democratic control, and are ostensibly designed to protect rather than defeat honesty and fairness in the election process. When particular action is taken which flagrantly violates The correlative right, the right to vote, has been judicially recognized but has received uneven protection. In discipline cases, the principle interest in membership protected by the courts is the right to participate in union government, and barring a member from voice and vote in the union is treated as equivalent to expulsion. In election cases the courts have indicated some willingness to inquire whether individual members have been arbitrarily denied the opportunity to vote either by lack of notice of the election 91 93. The union has a total dues paying membership of 280,000, but only 131,000 are "senior" members entitled to vote. The rest are classified as "junior" or "apprentice" members. Local 138 on Long Island had 500 "senior" members, 400 "apprentices," 300 "B" members, and 500 to 1,000 permit men. In spite of the prevailing judicial concern to protect the nomination process, some judges have at times closed their eyes to devices which discourage or prevent the nomination of opposition candidates. In Buscarello v. Guglielmelli,98 for example, an opposition candidate for president was nominated for the first time in years. The incumbent president quickly declared the nominations closed and ruled that the opponent's nomination failed for want of a second. The court refused to intervene to void this ruling. Similarly, in Harrison v. O'Neill,99 the incumbent president ruled that opposition candidates were disqualified because they had not previously been members of the executive board. This ruling was based on an alleged amendment which, if it had in fact been adopted, was tailored to forestall opposition candidates and was adopted without the knowledge of the opposition group. Again, the court refused to intervene, apparently insensitive to the implications of the union's conduct and the need for judicial protection. extremes in judicial attitudes. In Gray v. Atkins,'" the election committee sought not only to insure honesty but also some measure of competitive equality by requiring that the union newspaper give equal space to the opposition and that membership lists be available to all candidates. The court refused to aid the election committee in providing either honesty or equality. After the Court of Appeals in Madden v. Atkins 'IO had declared so forcefully that the judiciary must assume responsibility for protecting democratic processes in unions, the court was confronted with another election in Local 88. In this election, held under the supervision of a court-appointed referee,111 the union newspaper was required to remain impartial, no campaign literature was allowed to be printed or distributed at union expense, the emblem of the international could not be used on campaign literature, membership lists were to be available to any candidate and a copy provided for $4, and the ballots were to list candidates alphabetically without any indication who was an incumbent. Even where the court recognizes the need to insure competitive equality, its protection may be half-hearted and incomplete. In Contes v. Ross,.2 the opposition group claimed that the election committee had been handpicked by the administration; that the committee had given the administration a campaign advantage by delaying passing on the qualifications of the opposition candidates and then casting a cloud on their eligibility to hold office; that one leading member of the opposition slate had been placed in a separate row on the ballot as an independent, thus tending to confuse and divide the opposition vote; and that the local's newspaper, controlled by the administrator, campaigned for the administration slate and bitterly attacked the opposition candidates. The plaintiffs asked that a supervisor be appointed to run the election, or in the alternative that the election be enjoined until these conditions were corrected. The court ordered the union newspaper to remain neutral and refrain from printing articles favoring any candidate, but gave no relief against the other alleged acts of unfairness. The court's concern for fairness may lead it to withhold its hand when it suspects that the litigation is but a maneuver to obtain a political advantage. In Fritsch v. Rarback,118 a leader of the opposition group sued to compel an election, claiming that the amendment extending the term of office from one . 1950) , and then apparently revived the issue as to earlier referenda which they had not questioned. They fared no better in a subsequent suit to two years was invalid because it had not been adopted by secret ballot as required by the constitution. The court held that the amendment had not been validly adopted, but refused to grant the requested relief. It noted that the plaintiff had waited for a year and a half after the amendment was adopted and brought suit less than three months before the requested election. "To grant the relief demanded at this late date", the court observed, "would not be an act of equity but an abetment of a tactical maneuver, hostile to the best interests of the membership."1114 E. The Standard of Public Virtue.
The courts never state that in deciding election disputes they will inquire into the relative virtue of the contestants, but the cases suggest that claims of communism and corruption carry weight not only at the polls but at the bar of justice. The marked tendency in discipline cases to deny judicial protection to alleged communists extends to the election cases where those so labelled have been singularly unsuccessful in obtaining legal relief.115 In one case, for example, candidates on an opposition slate were summarily disqualified for having brought suit against the union to contest a trusteeship summarily imposed to eliminate communist influence and for "association with Communists." The court refused to restore them to the ballot,116 even though discipline for bringing suit is generally against public policy and candidates cannot normally be declared ineligible without procedural due process.117
Judicial willingness to intervene in election disputes seems to be greatest when the court believes that the incumbent officers are corrupt. The two cases in which elections were ordered were ones in which local unions sought to to upset another referendum shortly before an election, allegedly for the purpose of blocking an election which they knew they could not win. Uhrich,123 the court restored to the ballot a candidate who had once been suspended from office for mishandling welfare funds. The affidavits and other information presented to the court, however, painted his old offense in grayer tones and did not leave those who had summarily stricken his name from the ballot unsmudged. His right to a fair hearing before being disqualified controlled over the inconclusive test of public virtue. These are the principle standards which seem to guide the courts in adjudicating election disputes. The first four-the union constitution, democratic rights, honesty, and fair competition-essentially supplement each other. The election may be required to fulfill all four. Constitutional clauses which clash with the other three standards can be construed to conform to them or, if necessary, can be declared void as contrary to public policy. These four standards are not only appropriate but absolutely essential, and the election process lacks full protection to the extent that the courts follow blindly the words of the constitution and fail to recognize the supervening claims of democratic rights, honesty and fair competition. The fifth standard, that of public virtue, can clash irreconcilably with the other standards and the cases show that in spite of its inappropriateness it often prevails.
In the application of all of the standards the courts manifest a recurring reluctance to become involved in the seemingly minor details of the election process. Stuffing the ballot box or misreporting the results will not be tolerated, but requiring strict accounting for the ballots to prevent fraud does not always obtain judicial support. Disqualifying candidates without a hearing is summarily enjoined, but rules adopted to obstruct opposition nominations may go unexamined. The integrity of the election, however, depends on these details and any meaningful protection of the process requires close judicial scrutiny at this level. Only the crude or incautious union officials flaunt the standards of honesty, democratic rights or fair competition; the shrewd and sophisticated rely on more subtle manipulations. Although the cases reveal that some judges do inquire closely into the details, many shun this responsibility and excuse themselves by echoing hollow doctrines of judicial non-intervention. As a result, the standards remain undeveloped and unpredictably enforced.
III. TIMING OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
Casting ballots is not the beginning but the culmination of the election process. Many of the disputes brought before the courts occur at stages of that process which precede the balloting. Many others which concern the dared that the plaintiff "actually represents only a handful of discredited Communists and fellow travelers". The plaintiff chided him for injecting "snide, wild flagrant charges of communism" and then suggested that the defendants hands were not so clean in that he had allegedly condoned the conduct of a notorious gangster who had been an officer in the . 1959) . If the plaintiff seeks to block the holding of the election, rather than merely correct a defect, Temporary injunction procedures limit the thoroughness of judicial inquiry, for the court must rely almost entirely on affidavits and assertions by counsel. Close study of the cases, however, suggests that the judges are in fact quite fully informed, not only as to the specific issues, but also as to the background of the whole election contest.
B. Post-Election Remedies
The New York courts will review an election after the balloting,'39 but the limited value of post-election remedies is attested by the fact that only one case has been found in which the court has ordered a new election '40-and that was one in which the officers who had been reelected were charged and later found guilty of misuse of union funds.'4' If the defects arose prior to the voting and could have been raised at that time, a protest coming after the election may be declared to be too late. Once the election is finished, the decisions of election committees, canvassing boards or union officials seem to gain an increased presumption of regularity.'42 Through the cases runs a visible judicial reluctance to impose on the union the financial burden and internal disruption which comes with voiding an election and ordering a new one.'43
The most difficult problem confronting the court in post-election cases is determining whether the defect was substantial enough to void the election. The reluctance to order a new election has led the courts to impose on the plaintiff the impossible task of showing that his defeat was caused by the defect.'44 Thus, in one case the court found that the union newspaper had been improperly used to attack the opposition slate, but it refused to set aside the election saying that there was "no evidence that these articles affected the results of the election."'45 The judge gave no hint what "evidence" might conceivably be produced. In another case, the plaintiff claimed that [Vol. 70:1221 other candidates who ran against him but were also defeated were not qualified to run, and that the election was therefore void. The court dismissed his claim saying that there was no indication that he would have received any larger proportion of the votes.148
The test apparently applied by the courts-whether the defect provided the margin of victory-is not only impossible to administer but overlooks one of the most important functions of union elections. Opposition groups in unions frequently have no serious expectation of winning but seek only to voice a protest and perhaps build a base for future elections. Defects in the election blunt the edge of their protest and undermine their base for the future; an inflated majority solidifies the administration's power and discourages others from attempting to protest or challenge the incumbents. The very lack of a two-party system in most unions requires that the strength of the opposition be measured accurately. This is doubly true in elections of international officers where defeating the incumbents is extremely difficult and most elections serve little purpose other than as a focus for protest.
Study of the cases emphasizes the importance of judicial intervention before the voting. Lawyers who have been involved in these cases agree that preelection remedies are the only ones of any practical value. Correction of defects prior to the voting gives the members that to which they are entitled -a fair and honest election in the first instance. It also protects the union from the instability of an unsettled election and the cost and disruption of a new election. Post-election remedies provide too little protection for the members and too much burden for the union.
C. Exhaustion of Internal Union Remedies
The exception-riddled doctrine that courts will not intervene in internal union disputes until all appeals within the union have been exhausted has little practical impact on the timing of judicial intervention in election disputes. In nearly half of the cases there is no trace that the question of exhaustion was ever raised. In a number of others the files show that the issue was argued by the parties but was apparently by-passed by the court which disposed of the case on its substantive merits with no mention of the doctrine.147 If the court can not ignore the issue, the doctrine presents no insuperable handicap to immediate intervention, for one or more of the multiple exceptions are always available to excuse exhaustion.
The doctrine has never required resort to all internal appeals, but only those reasonably available,148 for the doctrine must accommodate the competing The reach of these exceptions does not mean that the rule is never applied,'64 for the courts do not always make full use of the available exceptions. Study of the cases makes clear that the judge's willingness to excuse exhaustion depends largely on his judgment of the underlying merits of the case. Thus in Daley v. Stickel,'65 where an opposition group was seeking to oust convicted extortioners, the court "liberally construed" the complaint to find sufficient allegations that internal appeals would be futile. In Kelman v. Kaplan,166 however, a candidate who had apparently been properly disqualified was told that he must wait for a decision by the international executive board even though the judge knew that no such decision would be made until a month after the election. In one or two cases, however, application of the exhaustion rule can be charitably explained only as a throwback to the primitive judicial refusal to intervene.'67 In Gray v. Atkins,'68 the election committee sought a temporary injunction to enable it to enforce certain minimum safeguards in the handling of mail ballots, obtain a membership list with the financial standing of the members, and to require that each candidate be given equal access to the union mailing list and union newspaper. The suit was directed against Atkins, the president of both the local and the international and who had ousted the committee from control of the election. The motion for a temporary injunction was made on October 21 and the election was to conclude on December 1, but the judge refused to rule on the motion until January 26, seven weeks after the election. He then dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the election committee had failed to exhaust its internal appeals to the international executive board-a board presided over, if not dominated, by Atkins. This was described by the judge as "a complete and workable system of procedure .. . which adequately protects the plaintiffs in all their rights."189
The predominant pattern in the cases is one of early judicial intervention in election disputes with a strong preference for getting all possible disputes adjudicated before the voting. The courts do not allow the exhaustion doctrine to obstruct early intervention. Appeals beyond the international president, which are in fact commonly futile and too long delayed, are regularly excused. If the ballot is improperly arranged, its use can be enjoined until it is corrected. At this point, however, the court may become more deeply involved, for it may be called upon to prescribe the proper form. Similarly, disputes over time and place of voting, the number of poll watchers, and similar details may require the court to make regulations governing the election, and the union constitution may give no guide. The courts do not lack the legal tools for such tasks, but the cases suggest that they are reluctant to become burdened with such details, particularly if a number are presented in the same case.176 Disputes over the use of the union newspaper present an additional problem, for such disputes normally do not arise until it has already been used by one side. Enjoining further partisanship is not only difficult to enforce but also fails to rectify the wrong.177 The alternative is to require equal access which again requires close attention by the courts.
The study of election cases shows that the great majority of them can be disposed of with relatively simple remedies. The disputes involve detailed elements of the election process, the factual background may be complex, and the standards to be applied may be unclear, but the court is seldom asked to become extensively involved in regulating the process. Narrow intervention, though in depth, neither frightens nor frustrates the courts. Serious problems arise, however, where narrow intervention is not adequate to insure a fair election. This problem becomes particularly acute when the court compels an election to free a local union from trusteeship, for there may be special reasons to fear that the trustee and the international officers who are administering the local will exploit every possibility to retain effective control. 178 Two The courts can not undertake to run the labor unions in detail or to interpret their laws upon every point of internal controversy The judgment . . can not be amended to embrace other controversies arising from time to time . . .181 Encouraged by this, the international reimposed the trusteeship and proceeded to an election free of court supervision. When the election committee, controlled by the trustee, refused to disqualify Nuzzo as a candidate for president, although he had already been shown to have stolen the union treasury and was then under indictment for embezzlement, the local executive board voted to postpone the election two weeks. In spite of this, the trustee proceeded to hold an election on the original date, at which Nuzzo was elected. Two weeks later the local executive board held another election at which the insurgents were reelected. Not surprisingly, the international officers, confirmed Nuzzo's election, though scarcely before he was convicted of embezzlement and sentenced to Sing Sing for ten to twenty years. The court then belatedly felt compelled to intervene, and in Canfield v. Moreschi,182 found that the local executive board's postponing of the election was within its emergency power and confirmed the insurgents in office. Thus, the court finally achieved the original purpose of protecting the members' "substantial right to elect their own responsible officers." Quite a different method was used to accomplish a judicially decreed election in Local 88 of the Masters', Mates and Pilots.183 After the court refused to intervene in Gray v. Atkins,184 the entrenched group retaliated against the opposition by expelling its leaders. Early in 1958 they were ordered reinstated by the Court of Appeals,'85 and almost simultaneously Atkins was convicted of bribery for "back-door shipping."'86 When Atkins sought to resign as president of the local and name a president pro-tem, the opposition group seized control of the meeting, suspended the officers, and elected new temporary officers. The international then imposed a trusteeship.'87 In terminating this trusteeship, the court did not attempt to write a decree regulating the details of the election, but obtained a stipulation that it should be conducted by a court-appointed administrator.'88 In spite of the background of bitter litigation, distrust and violence, the administrator was able to resolve all disputes as they arose.189 He issued detailed rules prescribing the procedure for making nominations, ruled on all challenges to eligibility of office, determined the form of the ballot and the safeguards to be used in handling mail ballots. Reinforced by broad powers, he was able to obtain agreement from the parties on most points, including the right of any candidate to a copy of the membership list and a prohibition against the printing of any campaign literature at union expense. He ultimately counted the ballots and ruled on all challenges to eligibility to vote. Even though the election was extremely close, this careful and constant supervision foreclosed protests and brought a measure of stability to the troubled local.190
These two cases emphasize the infinitely complex task confronting a court in protecting the election process when the situation requires extensive judicial intervention. The first case demonstrates the near impossibility of drafting a decree fully disposing of every detail and the destructive consequences of leaving a single gap. Meaningful protection of the members' right to elect their officers may in some cases require continuing supervision-a burden which judges are understandably reluctant to assume. The second case demonstrates that the judicial process need not be so inflexible or unimaginative. Where extensive intervention is required, an administrator or special master can be named to relieve the judges of the burden and dispose of disputes without delay. [Vol.70:1221 This is not intended to suggest that courts should freely exercise such broad supervisory powers. It only suggests that in some cases extensive intervention may be required, and when it is required the courts have ample resources to meet the need without the judges becoming overwhelmed by the complexity of the task.
CONCLUSION
This study has been limited to state court litigation and no attempt has been made to relate the decisions here to specific substantive or procedural provisions of Title IV of the Labor Reform Act. The experience of state courts described here, however, has manifold implications in the administration of the federal statute. Only some of the most obvious can be suggested here.
First, the federal statute has expressly adopted the critical standards which the courts have only hesitantly followed, and has given those standards specific content by including specific rules as illustrative examples. Title IV, like the statute itself, has at its core protection of the democratic process, and the basic rights to be guaranteed are illustrated by specific provisions protecting the right to make nominations, to be a candidate, to support candidates and to vote. Supp. 1961) . This, however, was narrowly worded as an exceptional restriction on the union's otherwise broad freedom to determine the qualifications for office. It is not an invitation for the court to substitute its judgment of the relative virtues of the candidates for the free choice of the members, and thereby deny both union autonomy and union democracy.
198. The ambiguous and incomplete words of the union constitution must now be interpreted against the background of these standards, and general terms of the statute draw meaning from these central values. Most important, the catch-all clause that "adequate safeguards to insure a fair election shall be provided," makes these pervasive statutory standards applicable to every element of the election process.
Second, effective protection of the election process requires scrupulous attention to details at every stage from selection of the election committee to tabulation of the ballots, for one seemingly small flaw can undermine the integrity of the whole process. A "fair election" within the meaning of the statute is one in which the basic statutory standards have been observed at every stage of the process. The courts and the Secretary of Labor must therefore be sensitive to the importance of details and make close inquiry into every claimed defect to discover its actual impact on the process. The test is not whether the defect can make the difference between victory and defeat in the election but whether it violates the statutory standards.
Third, effective enforcement of the statute must rest on pre-election remedies. Challenging an election after it has been conducted has proven too slow and burdensome to be of much practical value,199 and the availability of such a remedy under the federal statute should not cause the courts to withhold pre-election protection.200 The state courts have recognized that correcting defects prior to an election gives the members the fair election to which they are entitled; saves the union the costs and disruption of a second election; and lightens the court's responsibility. Congress was aware of these advantages and deliberately preserved pre-election remedies ;201 the courts ought not be niggardly in their use. Only through such remedies can the courts give vital substance to the standards of democratic rights, fair competition, and honesty in union elections. 
